

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15

USIA-12 IO-13 AID-20 DPW-01 RSR-01 /139 W

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R 291000Z JUN 73 ZFD

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3904

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS

AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMCONSUL DANANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 11734

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR VS

SUBJECT: ICCS: AMB WASILEWSKI'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. ROSTOW JUNE 24

1. SUMMARY: EUGENE ROSTOW HAD EXTENSIVE CONVERSATION WITH POLISH ICCS HEAD WASILEWSKI AT SOCIAL OCCASION JUNE 24. MAIN POINTS MADE BY WASILEWSKI WERE: SUGGESTION THAT POLAND ALSO WITHDRAW FROM ICCS; ICCS SHOULD BRING PARTIES TOGETHER ON "FUNDAMENTALS" RATHER THAN CONCENTRATING ON ADJUDICATING COMPLAINTS; AGREEMENT THAT NVN HAD NOT RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST SVN FOR THE SAME REASONS WHICH MADE USE OF FORCE INADMISSIBLE BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES OR THE TWO KOREAS; ARGUMENT THAT PRG WAS AFRAID IT WOULD BE CRUSHED BY SVN WITHOUT NVN SUPPORT; AND SUGGESTION THAT SVN BE NEUTRALIZED. END SUMMARY.

2. WASILEWSKI SAID HE HAD COME TO SVN WITH ENTHUSIASM AND HOPE, BUT NOW DEEPLY REGRETTED POLAND'S DECISION TO ACCEPT ICCS MEMBERSHIP
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SINCE IT PUT POLAND AT ODDS WITH U.S. WHEREAS IT WAS THE HIGHEST PURPOSE OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. IF IT SEEMED DESIRABLE TO MATCH CANADIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ICCS WITH ANOTHER WITHDRAWAL, HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT POLAND GET OUT.

3. ROSTOW SAID HE THOUGHT SUCH A STEP WOULD BE REGRETTABLE. HE COULD SEE NO REASON FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN POLAND AND THE U.S. ON THE MATTER, IF THE ICCS REALLY TACKLED THE JOB OF CARRYING OUT THE JANUARY AGREEMENT.

4. WASILEWSKI SAID THE TASK WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, SINCE THERE WAS DISTRUST AMONG THE VIETNAMESE PARTIES. IN HIS VIEW, THE ICCS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER ON FUNDAMENTALS, NOT ON ADJUDICATION COMPLAINTS ABOUT WLLEGEF#CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. WHAT GOOD WOULD IT DO IF THE ICCS FOUND THAT ONE PARTY WAS GUILTY IN X PERCENT OF THE CASES, THE OTHER IN Y PERCENT, AND THAT THEY COULD NOT DECIDE THE REST ? THE ROOT OF THE TROUBLE, IN HIS VIEW, WAS THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ACCORD. HOW COULD THE PRG AGREE TO AN ELECTION IF FULL POLITICAL ACCESS TO THE VOTERS WAS NOT ASSURED ? WASILEWSKI HAD BEEN TOLD IN HANOI THAT REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM WAS MANY YEARS AWAY. ROSTOW REMARKED THAT THIS VIEW DATED FROM OCTOBER, 1972, AND WAS SURELY NOT HANOI'S POSITION IN THE SPRING OF 1972. IF THAT WERE HANOI'S POLICY NOW, WHY WERE THEY STILL IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, WHY WERE THEY STILL INFILTRATING SVN, AND WHY HAD THEY REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE DMZ ?

5. AS FOR THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT, SURELY THEY WERE FOR THE SVN PARTIES TO SETTLE. THE POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL PREMISES OF THE JANUARY AGREEMENT, WHICH THE POWERS HAD SUPPORTED IN MARCH, WAS THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN SVN WAS NOT NVN'S BUSINESS. AS A MATTER OF WORLD POLITICS, AND PEACE, THAT HAD TO BE THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE, ALWAYS THE CASE IN KOREA. WASILEWSKI AGREED THAT NVN AND SVN WERE SEPARATE "NATIONS", BUT THAT AFTER ALL THEY WERE THE SAME PEOPLE. HE AGREED WITH ROSTOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRINCIPLE WAS BASIC, AND THAT NVN HAD NO RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST SVN, FOR THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL REASONS WHICH MADE THE USE OF FORCE INADMISSIBLE BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES OR THE TWO KOREAS.

6. WASILEWSKI SAID THE PRG WAS AFRAID THAT IT WOULD SIMPLY BE CRUSHED IN SVN, WITHOUT NVN SUPPORT. ROSTOW UNDERSTOOD THAT THUS CONFIDENTIAL

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FAR ALL THE PEOPLE WHO SPOKE FOR THE PRG WERE IN FACT OFFICERS OF THE NVN ARMY, UNDER THE ORDERS OF HANOI. WASILEWSKI SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, AND THAT EVEN IF SOME WERE OFFICERS, THEY WERE GENUINE SOUTHERNERS, NOT UNDER HANOI'S CONTROL.

7. ROSTOW AGREED THAT THE ICCS MIGHT DO USEFUL WORK IF IT PRESSED FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE JANUARY AGREEMENT - THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVN FORCES, AND THE PROVISIONS ABOUT THE DMZ. WASILEWSKI SAID THAT ICCS JURISDICTION WAS CONFINED TO SVN, NOT LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND THAT THE NVN FORCES INSIDE SVN WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THE AGREEMENT, BUT HE AGREED WITH ROSTOW THAT "WE ALL UNDERSTOOD WHY THE OMISSION WAS MADE" AND THAT THE PRINCIPLE APPLIED.

8. ROSTOW PRESSED HARD ON THE QUESTION OF THE DMZ. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NVN WAS MOVING PEOPLE INTO THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, AND IN EFFECT ANNEXING A SLICE OF THE SALAMI. THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY INADMISSIBLE. THE U.S. HAD UNDERTAKEN UNDER A TREATY TO GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF SVN TO THE DMZ. THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD IF AMERICAN TREATIES WERE NOT FULLY RESPECTED. HE WAS SURE THAT WHILE WE WERE PATIENT, AND CONCERNED WE WOULD USE FORCE AGAIN IF NECESSARY TO INSIST THAT THE BASIC TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT BE CARRIED OUT. HE URGED WASILEWSKI TO WARN HIS FRIENDS IN HANOI "NOT TO PLAY WITH THE U.S. THAT WAS A MOST DANGEROUS GAME". THE KEY POINT WAS THAT THEY SIMPLY HAD TO GET OUT OF LAOS, CAMBODIA AND SVN, AND RESTORE AND RESPECT THE DMZ, AS KISSINGER HAD REMARKED THE OTHER DAY, AND LEAVE THE POLITICS OF SVN TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES MEETING IN PARIS.

9. WASILEWSKI AGREED THAT THE CHANGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. WAS VERY HOPEFUL, AND THAT A FIRM AND FAIR U.S. POLICY COULD "EQUILIBRATE" THAT SET OF RELATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF GENERAL PEACE. HE APPRECIATED AND APPROVED THE U.S. POSITION IN THAT REGARD, AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT ALLIED WITH OR AGAINST EITHER CHINA OR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WERE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO WAR, AND IN FAVOR OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION. THIS WAS A POLICY THAT HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF POLAND, WHICH, AS ALWAYS, WAS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE. HE NOMINALLY DEFENDED THE U.S.S.R. AGAINST CHINESE CHARGES OF POTENTIAL AGGRESSION, AND SAID THE SOVIETS HAD CONFIDENTIAL

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LARGE FORCES IN SIBERIA ONLY BECAUSE THERE WERE SO MANY CHINESE, WHO MIGHT CROSS THE BORDER IN VAST NUMBERS, EVEN UNARMED.

10. AT SEVERAL POINTS, WASILEWSKI RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRALIZING SVN. ROSTOW SAID HE COULD SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS WITH THE IDEA UNLESS IT INCLUDED NVN AS WELL. AS HE RECALLED, PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD ONCE COMMENTED ON A NEUTRALITY PROPOSAL IN THIS SENSE. THE THOUGHT OF NEUTRALIZING SVN WHILE NVN REMAINED WHAT IT IS, ROSTOW THOUGHT, WAS HARDLY A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH.
WHITEHOUSE

NOTE BY OCT: SAIGON 11734 # AS RECEIVED.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 10 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: VS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 JUN 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: elyme
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SAIGON11734
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730635/abqcehrh.tel
Line Count: 157
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: elyme
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21-Aug-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <19-Oct-2001 by elyme>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ICCS: AMB WASILEWSKI'S CONVERSATION WITH MR. ROSTOW JUNE 24
TAGS: MARR
To: STATE INFO BUDAPEST
JAKARTA
OTTAWA
WARSAW
JEC PARIS
BIEN HOA
CAN THO

DANANG
NHA TRANG

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005